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Baltimore's effective revitalization efforts are internationally recognized in planning and urban design. After the
successful Charles Center redevelopment plan in the late 1950s, Baltimore's efforts expanded to its Inner Harbor
and waterfront. In this sequel to a two-part article that started in FOCUS 13, Vicente del Rio discusses these later
efforts, and how Baltimore ensured a process for sustainable economic, social, and cultural revitalization.
"Designing a dream city is easy; rebuilding a living
one takes imagination" (Jacobs, 1958, p. 242)

I

n FOCUS's last issue, I published the ÿrst of a two-part essay
on Baltimore's revitalization e°orts that started in the late
ÿfties with the Charles Center Plan in the downtown.1 I also
discussed how Baltimore success with two plans re˝ected
Godshalk's (2004) model of sustainability with livability at the
apex. thus revitalization (see Figure 17 below, page 73).
The success of the 1950s Charles Center Plan encouraged the
city leaders to move their attention to the Inner Harbor, only
two blocks south. By establishing a new synergy between
the city and its waterfront, the Inner Harbor Plan revealed
untapped potential and generated strong social, economic,
cultural, and recreational impacts. With the success of its
Inner Harbor and its impacts in the downtown, Baltimore
became a worldwide model for waterfront revitalization. Over
the years, Baltimore's Inner Habor has received numerous
national and international awards, including the prestigious
Heritage Award from the Urban Land Institute in 2009.2 In
this essay, I will discuss the plan's major elements, from its
conception to around 2005, noting their role in transforming
the Inner Harbor into a model of sustainable urban waterfront
revitalization (see also the timeline in Figure 18).

1
See From Downtown to the Inner Harbor: Baltimore's Sustainable
Revitalization E˛orts, FOCUS 13, 2016.
2
Periodically, the ULI gives the Heritage Award to developments
of excellence that demonstrated substantial contributions to their
community's well-being for at least 25 years. Only nine developments
have received the award in the past 40 years.
3
That same year, Wallace and Thomas Todd partnered with William
Roberts and Ian McHarg (the famous landscape architect) to form
WHRT (later Wallace Roberts & Todd), that became one of the most
celebrated and active planning/design ÿrms in the US.

The Inner Harbor Plan is Born
The city's natural choice for the new initiative rested in the authors of the Charles Center Plan; David Wallace and his team.3
The Inner Harbor Project I Urban Renewal Plan was adopted
in 1967. Approximately one-third of the plan area had to be
cleared of all existing structures for redevelopment and to restore public access to the water and recreation, particularly due
to the lack of such spaces downtown (Figures 1 & 2). The plan
initially included a 240-acre one-block deep area around the
water’s edge and predicted investments of $260 million over
thirty years (Figure 3). Later, plans for Inner Harbor West and
East were approved.
The Inner Harbor Plan included ÿve major components: a) high
quality commercial and o˜ce buildings along the waterfront; b)
multifamily housing in the eastern and western areas; c) a low
mandatory build-to cornice line for buildings in the block immediately surrounding the waterfront and commercial uses at
the street level; d) no talll building would be permitted on the
waterfront except for a few iconic towers; and e) the waterfront
would feature parks, public areas and a wide promenade (Brambilla & Longo, 1979; Millspaugh, 1980, 2003; Wallace, 2004).
Generally speaking, the area's development was coherent with
the original master plan vision and principles despite several
adaptations to community and market pressures over the years.
Perhaps the major adaptations su°ered by the plan were due to
the unforeseen surge in the restaurant, recreation, and tourism
industries, together with the worldwide renaissance of the idea
of downtowns. Baltimore's Inner Harbor plan was a pioneer in
its vision, components, and implementation process, having received more architecture and urban planning prizes than any
other similar project in the United States.
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Figures 1 & 2: The Inner Harbor in 1948 and in the late 1950s, after
clearance and new bulkheads. (sources: www.ghostofbaltimore.org Robert F. Kniesche, Baltimore Sun; and author's archives, source unknown)

Two major phases marked the plan development process, corresponding to the city's political and economic needs. During
the ÿrst phase, the process was dedicated to convincing the
residents and the business community that Baltimore was a city
worth taking part in and that the needs for recreation and open
space could be provided for in the waterfront. In 1964 voters approved the emission of $66 million in city bonds for the Inner
Harbor Plan that, together with $47 million from federal urban
renewal grants, paid for the acquisition of land and vacant warehouses, site clearance, and a new bulkhead along the waterline.
Given the growing success of the city ethnic fair and other
public events in Charles Center’s Hopkins Plaza, the city decided
to move them to the much larger waterfront and capitalize on
the ethnic diversity of its neighborhoods. A stong publicity
campaign –as in no other American city until then– started

to attract crowds to events in the Inner Harbor, animating it
and creating an awareness of its potential. This moment also
represented an attempt by the city to start amending the deep
social schisms that were still being felt from the racial riots and
unrest of the late 1960s. Harvey (1991) observed that when
the Baltimore's City Fair was moved from the Charles Center's
Hopkins Plaza to the vacated spaces on the water's edge, it
attracted nearly 2 million people, proving that large numbers
could be drawn to the downtown.
Another important initial factor was the transformation of the
Charles Center Development Corporation, the quasi-public corporation formed by the city to implement the Charles Center
Plan. In 1964 it became the Charles Center–Inner Harbor Management, Inc. Corporation (CC-IHDC) to deal with plan implementation in both areas. It did so through a special contract
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Figure 3: Major elements of the Inner
Harbor Plan; 1980's version with existing
and projected development. (original art
on a City of Baltimore original map)
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1. Federal Hill Historic District
2. Maryland Science Museum
3. Lutheran Church Housing
4. Otterbein Residential District
5. McCormick Spices Co.
6. Harborplace Pavillions
7. Hyatt Hotel
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13. Aquarium
14. Power Plant
15. Inner Harbor East
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supervised by the City: while the corporation managed the
development process, the city paid for all operating costs, real
estate purchases, and received the proÿts from all sales. According to Martin Millspaugh, CC-IHDC’s president from its founding
until 1985, all real estate transactions involving third parties had
to be approved in public meetings (Millspaugh, 2003).
The CC-IHDC’s dynamic performance was fundamental for
plan implementation, such as: leasing land (clearing investors
of a large starting cost), rents that were in proportion to proÿt
(which made mortgages easier), ˝exible ÿnancing, and investments in the land’s public infrastructure (Wrenn, 1983; Wallace,
2004). It should be noted that private developments always had
to pay for land and never ceased to pay local taxes. Only more
recently did the city start to o°er direct loans to developers, offer tax incentives, and promote proÿt-sharing ventures demonstrating the need for ˝exibility and responsiveness to the market over the long term (Millspaugh, 2003).
Millspaugh (1980; 2003) discusses the enormous political, technical, and administrative obstacles inherent in the process of
buying almost 1,000 buildings, relocating 700 businesses to
other locations (including the wholesale market), cleaning up
toxic sites, and dealing with twenty city/state/federal government agencies which held, in one way or another, jurisdiction
over some aspect of the Inner Harbor. One of the most di˜cult
battles involved making the State of Maryland’s transportation
authority drop a destructive highway project that would destroy
historic districts, such as Federal Hill and Fells Point, and impose
a 14-lane low-level bridge over the Inner Harbor. Wong (2012) recounts Baltimore's victorious war against this project and the importance of the SOM team commissioned by the city assess the
project's impacts, combined with political pressure, advocacy
planning, media campaigns, civic protests, and legal challenges.
In the early seventies, after obtaining initial ÿnancing, the CC-IH
focused on attracting private investors and winning the conÿdence of Baltimoreans, generating what Millspaugh (1980)
calls “critical mass”. The ÿrst designated attraction in the Inner
Harbor was the replica of the historic US frigate Constellation
stationed in a pier and open to visitation in 1969. By 1973, the
new boulevards bordering the Inner Harbor and the waterfront promenade and parks were ready, and the Torsk –the US
submarine that sunk the last Japanese ship during World War
II– was moored in the Inner Harbor and opened to the public.
During the 1976 Bicentennial celebrations, eight tall ships from
di°erent countries sailed from New York and docked in the Inner Harbor, attracting thousands of visitors. To this day, tall ships
from navies from around the world moor at the Inner Harbor
for days at a time, always resulting in attracting large numbers
of visitors. With a constant and diverse array of events, tour and
event boats, water taxis, paddle boats for rent, and the open-
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ing of almost 160 private marinas slips, the Inner Harbor had
captivated the public, making Baltimore residents proud, and
propelling a new positive city image nationally.
Since inauguration, the Inner Harbor is a lively and robust urban
destination where the mix of commercial, touristic, leisure, and
residential uses, the quality of public space and architecture,
and the symbiosis with the water, produces a socially and
economically sustainable place that attracts visitors, national
and international tourists, residents, and the downtown
working population. It is important to note that, even with
the strong impetus for development and at least for the ÿrst
two decades, the city tried to ensure that the Inner Harbor's
urban design and architecture was respectful of the remaining
historical structures and preserved a strong relation to the
waterfront, since physical and visual access to the water and
maritime activities were unique attractions. Fundamentally, this
was achieved through one of the plan's major elements, the
waterfront promenade: a pedestrian walkway along the water’s
edge connecting districts and attractions and featuring seating,
attractive landscaping, lighting, and educational signage.
The original plan promoted the waterfront -its promenade, public and open spaces- as the magnet for a lively and attractive mix
of commercial, recreational, educational, and cultural attractions
as part of the Inner Harbor experience. To understand the location of the projects mentioned in the next sections, please see
map in Figure 3 and a recent aerial photograph in Figure 16.
The Initial Move
After building the bulkheads, infrastructure, and the promenade, and promoting public events, it was fundamental to attract developers and investors to the Inner Habor. This became
the CC-IHDC’s most important task, and new o˜ce buildings
became a priority given the success of Charles Center and the
Figure 4: From left to right: The Gallery (background), Harborplace's north
pavillion, and Maryland's World Trade Cennter. (source: Shutterstock)
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need for more modern leaseable space in the downtown. The
Inner Harbor's development potential as shown in the plan and
the support of the local business coalitions and organizations
were fundamental.
After the plan's approval, the ÿrst commercial building in the
new Inner Harbor was the US Fidelity and Guarantee Corporation (now the Transamerica Life Insurance Company) in 1975
(see # 11, Figure 3. A brutalist-modernist 35-story tower located
at the corner of the two boulevards that border the waterfront,
it was soon followed by a 625-car parking structure, the ÿrst of
many at the Inner Harbor. Subsequently, several o˜ce buildings
were built in the 1970s, sharing desirable locations with views
to the water, but following the plan's policy of staggering building heights along the boulevards to protect the Inner Harbor's
viewshed and avoid excessive shadowing on the waterfront.
The Maryland's World Trade Center was ÿnished in 1977 and became one of the Inner Harbor’s iconic building: a 28-story modernist concrete tower with a pentagonal footprint, designed
by I.M Pei for the State of Maryland’s Port Authority (see # 12,
Figure 3; Figure 4). With a lobby dedicated to public exhibits,
the building extends over the waterfront promenade with two
of its columns resting in the water and features a viewing deck
and a restaurant on the top ˝oor. Interestingly, the Transamerica and the WTC towers are very similar architecturally –in style,
detailing, and bulk-- generating a uniÿed waterfront proÿle. In
the 1980s several important companies and banks moved into
new buildings on or near the waterfront. In 1982, the Federal
Reserve Bank opened its local headquarters at the edge of the
Charles Center and only two blocks away from the Inner Harbor.
Over the last decades, a greater number of ventures went
beyond simple o˜ce space to include a richer mix of uses.
The ÿrst such example on a large scale was The Gallery at
Harborplace, completed in 1987 (Figure 4). Occupying an entire
city-block just across the boulevard abutting the waterfron'ts
north edge it includes an o˜ce tower, a 620-room hotel, a fourstory mall with retail and restaurants, and underground parking
for 1,150 vehicles; a pedestrian bridge connects the mall to the
waterfront just across the street. Unfortunately, development
sacriÿced several historic landmarks such as the 1910 art-deco
factory building of the McCormick Spice Company, which used
to add an attractive aromatic atmosphere to the waterfront
experience (see #5 in Figure 3). After a long battle lost by
preservationists, the building was demolished in 1989 to be
replaced by a sixty-story tower including 225 hotel rooms, 150
apartments, and 86,000 square feet of commercial space.
Food and Shopping: The Harborplace
As discussed above, the clearing of the Inner Harbor site,
construction of new bulkheads, promenade and marinas, the
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approval of the Inner Harbor Plan, and the public events agenda
transformed the waterfront into Baltimore's most popular
public space. The city needed to keep the momentum going
and use it to attract private investments and commercial uses.
The answer came in the late 1970s when local entrepreneur
James Rouse proposed a project similar to the successful Faneuil
Market Place which his company had recently developed in
Boston combining the experience of eating and shopping in a
historical context.
In the opposite direction of the shopping-center industry conventions of the time, with the Boston project, the Rouse Company had invented the concept of the festival marketplace: an
open, attractive old-market-like design that could entertain
middle-class buyers and make them feel comfortable, helping
suburban residents rediscover the central city pleasures (Frieden & Sagalyn,1991; Bloom, 2004). "A combination of good
luck and good planning made the downtown malls into a nearperfect match for emerging public tastes in the 1970s— the
time when the American public rediscovered food and history"
(Frieden & Sagalyn, 1991, p. 200).
For Baltimore's Harborplace, the city signed a 75-year ground
lease with the Rouse Company for $105,000 per year plus 25%
of proÿts (Bloom, 2004). Opened in 1980, the Harborplace pavilions are considered the most important project in revitalizing the Inner Harbor (see # 6, Figure 3 & Figure 5). Exceeding all
expectations, they received more than 500,000 people on the
opening day and more than 18 million in the ÿrst year (Levine,
1987; Kotler et al 1993; Wallace, 2004). Sales exceeded expectations by 60% and outperformed Boston's Faneuil Hall (Millspaugh, 2001; 2003).
Observing the Harborplace's importance, James Rouse noted
that “more than 60% of (its) visitors... had no intention to buy or
Figure 5: Harborplace's two pavillions and the corner plaza. Note
the footbridge over Light Street on the left, and part of World
Trade Center building on the right. (source: Google Earth)
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eat something, they were there just for the fun of being there,
for the spectacle which was thousands of people sitting, standing or strolling along the waterfront” (James Rouse in Bloom,
2004, p. 173). The Harborplace “injected new life into Baltimore’s
downtown… stimulated the construction of new hotels, a major convention center, and a new aquarium, turning Baltimore
into an important tourist city” (Kotler, Haider & Hein, 1993, p.
125). Being part of the “larger whole” made sense to visitors.
Located in the L-shaped corner site closest to the downtown
core, Harborplace was required to maintain the vista to the water and limit height to 40 feet (Figures 4 and 5). The solution
came in the form of two elegant, terraced, old-market-like pavilions that totalled 200,000 square feet dedicated to retail and
food. A public plaza with a small amphitheatre marks the corner
space between the two pavilions providing an animated linkage to the water's edge. At the time of its opening, Harborplace
included a food market, twelve restaurants, 37 small eateries, 58
stores (20 of which were food-related), and 35 kiosks and retail
carts. The building's transparency and the seating from the restaurants and cafe spilling to the outside provided a lively and
inviting ambience to the waterfront promenade (Figures 6 &
7). The Harborplace helped popularize the festival marketplace
typology in the US, and its design qualities were heralded by
famous urbanist William Whyte (1988, p. 94).
Pertaining to Baltimore's ambitious Skywalk system4, a footbridge originating at the Charles Center led to the Hyatt Hotel
and the Convention Center before crossing one of the Inner
Harbor main boulevards and arriving at the second ˝oor of the
Harborplace's west pavilion, where the food market and most
eateries were located (see # 9 in Figure 3). In the 2000s, the north
pavilion was connected by footbridge to The Gallery mixed-use
complex. The footbridges increased accessibility from the surroundings and animated the second stories, increasing their
commercial value.
How the Harborplace came to be is an interesting story. As
the Inner Harbor site had been cleared of all structures and
remained as open space for public use since the late 1950s,
the Rouse Company's initial proposal to the city was strongly
opposed by Baltimoreans. A strong campaign was launched
with James Rouse engaging personally in negotiations with
community and minority groups who granted their support
in exchange of commitments for jobs and opportunities for
small local businesses (Frieden & Sagalyn 1991; Wallace, 2004).
Harborplace was approved with speciÿc social goals: at least
10% of contractors, 25% of construction workers, and 50% of
retail jobs had to come from local minorities, there would be
job support services for minorities and a special e°ort to ÿnd
4
On the downtown Skywalk system and its fate, see Part 1 of this
essay in FOCUS 13, 2016.
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and attract minority retailers. From 2,000 proposals submitted
by merchants interested in the project, 140 were accepted, 91%
of which were from the local community and 20% represented
minorities. Of the 128 original stores, 22 were minority-owned.
In the beginning, the commitment to social responsibility
proved to be good for business, generating an attractive mix of
ethnic restaurants and retail that became one of Harborplace’s
unforeseen success formulas. However, the Rouse Company’s
inability and unwillingness to maintain the “small-scale
capitalism” –particularly the increasing overhead costs and
the complex demands of this type of business, the original mix
disappeared over time: today most of the Harborplace’s stores
and restaurants represent national chains and do not di°er
much from other shopping centers (Bloom 2004). Their appeal
and sales capacity remain high but now focus on suburban
residents and tourists visiting the Inner Harbor.

Figure 6: An amphitheatre between the Harborplace'pavillions animates
the link between the corner plaza and the water's edge. (photo: V. del Rio)
Figure 7: The ambience of the waterfront promenade is supported by the
pavillion's uses and transparency (below). (photo: V. del Rio)
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Figure 8: The National Aquarium soon after inauguration. (photo: V. del Rio)

Recreation and Culture
Attracting a collection of recreation and cultural venues was
one of the Inner Harbor Master Plan's original goals. In 1969,
Baltimore's Community College opened its new facilities only
two blocks north of the waterfront. In 1976, the Maryland Science Center opened its doors helping to animate the Inner Harbor's south-west corner (see #2, Figure 3) with 100,000 square
feet of exhibition space and a 150-seat planetarium —today it
also holds a ÿve-story IMAX theater.
Baltimore's most important of such venues is, by far, the National Aquarium, inaugurated in 1981.Inspired by Boston's New England Aquarium, Baltimore's National Aquarium turned out to be
a spectacularly successful project and pivotal for the city's revitalization e°orts (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1990). Its initial $21 million
price tag was covered by a voter-approved o°er of city bonds
combined with donations from corporations and individuals.
The aquarium's unique and complex architecture is attractive
from every angle, and its location on the Inner Harbor's most
prominent pier makes it a highly visible landmark (see #13, Figure 3; Figure 8). The building's design responds to an educational
route, leading visitors through bridges and split levels around a
central atrium, into rooms and over tanks that recreate di°erent
Maryland habitats and contain more than 5,000 live specimens.
Baltimore’s aquarium was so successful that even the most
optimistic estimations for the whole ÿrst year of operation
—400,000 to 600,000 visitors—proved modest: seven months
after inaugurating it had already received more than 1 million
people. In its ÿrst years, the aquarium was generating 3,000
jobs and $88 million to the local economy (Frieden & Sagalyn,
1989). In 1991, an annex was built on the next pier with a 1,200seat amphitheater for aquatic shows.
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Figure 9: Adaptive reuse of the historic Power Plant. (photo: V. del Rio)

Following the aquarium, a couple of piers to the east, a 1912
sewage pumping station became the Baltimore Public Works
Museum, and the popular tent-like Pier 6 Concert Pavillion was
installed. Originally built for 2,000 seated spectators plus 1,000
on the open lawns, in 1991 the pavilion was expanded and had
its seating capacity doubled.
The story of Baltimore's old Pratt Street Power Plant is a great
example of how the city managed to reconcile historic preservation, the Inner Harbor Plan's vision, and commercial needs.
Located at the pier next to the National Aquarium and built between 1900 and 1909, this massive industrial complex of three
contiguous red-brick buildings and three stacks had ceased operations in 1973. It remained vacant until 1985 when Six Flags
adapted it into an amusement park that operated for only four
years before going under and being replaced by a nightclub,
another short-lived initiative. Finally, in 2001, a local developer
successfully transformed the Power Plant into an entertainment complex with large tenants: Barnes & Nobles (where an
atrium allows views up through inside the original stacks), an
ESPN bar, and a Hard Rock Café (Figure 9). Beside it, on the same
pier, a new six-story building o°ers loft o˜ce space over restaurants and a ÿtness center. Today, this pier is a strong commercial
anchor to the east waterfront.
By 2005 Baltimore was hosting more than 35 festivals and
events and had numerous attractions at or immediately around
the Inner Harbor adding to its appeal and dynamism: a historica
carousel, the Hippodrome Theater complex (including three restored historic buildings), the University of Maryland’s marine
biotechnology center, and at least new six museums: the Port
Discovery (an interactive children’s museum in the restored ÿsh
market), the baseball museum next to the stadium, a museum
dedicated to the port’s history, the African-American Museum
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and, in 1995, the 1.1-acre campus of the American Visionary Art
Museum, dedicacted to new artists and experiemental art.
In order to support the Inner Harbor uses, particularly to attend
to tourists and shoppers, a trolley bus circulating on a dedicated
lane and serving the downtown along the waterfront was
started in 1985. The system was later expanded to other areas
linking several amenities and o°ering sightseeing tours.
Staying and Living
Gradually, hotels and residential uses became two of the
most important ingredients for the full implementation of the
Inner Harbor Master Plan's goals. Evidently, the most di˜cult
barrier to cross was Baltimore's downtown de-population and
˝ight to the suburbs, the city's troubled recent history, and
the perceived lack of major attractions there in the 1970s—
all still fresh in people's minds, particularly non-Baltimoreans.
Despite the success of Charles Center, there were not many
quality hotels left in the city, and room capacity was low.
Attracting new hotels was still considered an impossible leap
of faith when the Inner Harbor Plan was traced. However, the
Inner Harbor's success would unexpectedly make Baltimore a
tourism attraction and, fueled by its proximity to Washington
D.C., a destination for national conferences and conventions.
Fed by the city's growing recreation and business industries,
the hospitality industry would become one of the leaders
in Baltimore’s revitalization, helping to consolidate tourism,
supporting economic growth, and generating jobs.
The history of how Hyatt was convinced to build Baltimore's ÿrst
hotel in many years at the Inner Harbor is a great example of
CC-IHDC's fundamental role in implementing the master plan.
The city o°ered to pay for all public infrastructure costs and a
lot at Inner Harbor's north-south boulevard, a major access to
the downtown, in exchange for a lease based on proÿt-sharing
(see #7 in Figure 3). Moreover, in 1977 the Hyatt group also
received a loan ($10 million from a federal UDAG grant and $2
million from city funds) as a second mortgage that was not to
be repaid until after all costs associated with the ÿrst mortgage,
municipal taxes, hotel’s operations, and the lease were served
(Milspaugh, 2007; Pike, 2009).
Bulit in 1981, the Hyatt Inner Harbor is a 15-storey tower with
mirrored facades and 488-rooms with great views to the Inner
Harbor (Figure 10). It was connected by footbridges to Charles
Center, to the convention center, and to Harborplace. It became
"the chain's best-performing facility immediately upon its opening" (Wallace, 2004, pp. 138), and the CC-IH’s loan was paid in full
in only three years, rather than thirteen as originally expected.
By the end of the 2000s, the city collected approximately $3 million a year in taxes and fees from the hotel (Millspaugh, 2009).

Figure 10: Hyatt Regency Hotel, Inner Harbor. View from the
pedestrian bridge looking back from Harborplace. (photo: V. del Rio)

Following Hyatt’s success, within ÿve years the Inner Harbor
had the Intercontinental Harbor Court (200 rooms, 165 luxury
apartments, and a parking garage for 900 cars), the Days Inn
(250 rooms), Sheraton (350 rooms), Marriott (350 rooms), and
the Renaissance Harborplace (622 rooms). In 2008, on a former
public parking lot, the 757-room Hilton Baltimore opened with
direct access to the convention center, only two blocks away
from the Inner Harbor, the Orioles’ Camden Yards baseball
stadium, and a light-rail station. Today more than twenty
hotels o°er approximately 9,000 rooms within a mile from
the Inner Harbor, many in restored historic buildings. By 2011
Baltimore's hospitality industry was doing very well, and its
room occupancy rate was 3% higher than the national average.
However, attracting residential uses to the Inner Harbor was
tougher. Besides overcoming the area’s negative image, it was
also a question of changing life styles which, at the time, did not
favor living in the city. The original plan had envisaged upscale
residential towers along the waterfront to boost the tax base,
but developers were reticent to risk without the synergy of
other uses (Warren & McCarthy, 2002).
The ÿrst step came in 1974 when the Christ Lutheran Church
decided to build a 220-bed medical center, a nursing home,
and a low-income 9-story 291-apartment building for the
elderly, next to the church’s historic building and just across the
waterfront boulevard (see #3, Figure 3). But the turning point
came in the late 1970s when the city launched a pioneering
urban homesteading project in Otterbein, an area a few blocks
west of the Inner Harbor (see #4, Figure 3). The majority of
Otterbein's 120 red-brick town-houses with front-door marble
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steps, typical of Baltimore's 19th century architecture, were
vacant, in ruins, or had been condemned to give way to the
aborted state highway project discussed earlier. Left with the
ownership of these structures, the city decided to sell them
through a lottery for the nominal price of one dollar for local
applicants. The winners received the houses with liens that
included two important requirements: owners had to renovate
their properties to a minimal standard within six months, and
they had to live there for at least three years.
Relying on low-interest city loans and design guidelines to preserve the area's historical character, the houses were rapidly
restored (Figure 11). The process and the requirements in place
helped populate and revitalize Otterbein, avoiding predatory
speculative investments, particularly by out-of-towners. Local
developers built new townhouses on the vacant lots and con-

Figure 11: Historic town houses in Otterbein soon
after renovation in 1985. (photo: V. del Rio)

Figure 12: A new town house and an old church
converted to residential use, 1985. (photo: V. del Rio)
Figure 13: Development along Inner Harbor's south-east showing
the Harborview residential complex. The Inner Harbor is seen in
the background. (photo courtesy of Design Collective)
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verted a vacant historic church into residential lofts (Figure 12).
In his book The City – Rediscovering the Center, William Whyte
acknowledges Otterbein’s success and called it a very attractive
neighborhood, “a very Baltimore place and with front steps as
white as any in the city” (Whyte, 1988: 326).
Depopulation was Baltimore's and its downtown's most di˜cult problem to solve. Census data shows that the city’s total
population declined from 949,708 in 1950 –when it was at its
peak– to 620,961 in 2010. However, by the late 1980s, the regional housing market was diversifying and expanding, particularly for single people and young couples without children,
students, and retirees who preferred to live closer to downtown
and the Inner Harbor attractions.
In 2003, more than twenty new residential developments were
under construction or planned for the Inner Harbor, and 7,400
new units were projected to be made available by 2012 (Millspaugh, 2003). Besides serving new residents willing to be
close to the waterfront, many of these developments served
students and sta° from the nearbly University of Maryland at
Baltimore and Johns Hopkins educational and health services
(Millspaugh, 2003). Development included new buildings and
conversion of historical structures, in new and old neighborhoods. Reversing historical trends, the number of downtown
residents, particularly on and immediately around the waterfront, grew by 130 percent between 2000 and 2010 when Baltimore was ranked as the eighth densest metropolitan core in
the US with 5,485 families living downtown (Bernstein, 2011).
Perhaps the most impressive of the newer developments is
Harborview, a 42-acre, 2,600-unit residential complex at the old
Bethlehem Steel Shipyard Graving Dock in the Inner Harbor's
south-east shore, outside the original plan area (Figure 13).
Harborview includes the continuation of the waterfront promenade and a series of public open spaces, a 27-story residential
tower, three six-story apartment buildings, townhouses on two
piers, and a private marina with one hundred boat slips.
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Although mostly for a limited clientele, the Inner Harbor's
residential market became much stronger than the original
plan predicted as people “rediscovered” central locations and
the waterfront as desirable places to live. The sharp increase
in the average household income in the area conÿrms a high
degree of gentriÿcation caused by a limited number of “back
to the city” residents attracted by Baltimore’s economic growth
model, including from Washington and other cities, (Levine,
1987; Harvey, 1991 & 2009; Merriÿeld, 1992).
Convention Center
In the late 1970s, the city and the CC-IH decided for a high-quality convention center in the Inner Harbor's vicinity. Due to the
proximity of Washington DC (one-hour drive) and BaltimoreWashington International Airport (twenty-minute drive), and
served by Baltimore's Penn Station (5-minute drive), studies had
shown that the downtown could capture a signiÿcant share of
the convention market while generating business for the hotels
that Baltimore needed. The convention center was built in 1979
through city-issued bonds just a block west from the Inner Harbor (see #9, Figure 3 & Figure 16). Featuring an award-winning
modernist design, the state-of-the-art facility o°ered 425,000
square feet of exhibition and meeting space, and a public roof
garden. It was connected by footbridges to Charles Center and
to the Hyatt hotel and Harborplace's west pavilion. By the early
1980s, the convention center was booked for practically the entire year (Millspaugh, 1982) and, in 1986, it was expanded with
its capacity tripled.
The convention center was never meant to generate proÿt but
to be a catalyst for tourism, feeding the local hospitality and retail markets. In the early 2000's, conventions and conferences
accounted for more than 50% of the occupation rate in Inner
Harbor hotels. Because of the increasing competition from
newer and larger facilities in the region, in 2005 the city decided
to expand it yet another time and add a city-owned 757-room
hotel to the complex, the Hilton Baltimore. In the last few years,
the city has been considering plans to replace the original 1979
structure with an even larger facility and another hotel. It is
important to note that the convention center complex is now
connected by light rail line to the airport and the suburbs, and
is next to the Camden Yards Sports Complex, discussed below.
The Camden Yards Sports Complex
The Camden Yards Sports Complex proved to be a major
catalyst for Baltimore’s downtown and Inner Harbor, attracting
thousands of sports fans and tourists. The story began with
William Schaefer, four consecutive terms mayor (1971 to 1987)
and a key player in Baltimore’s revitalization, and his e°orts to
prevent the Orioles from leaving the city for new facilities in
the suburbs. He fought for the construction of a state-of-the-

Figure 14: The Orioles Park and the B&O historic building show in the
center, the renovated Camden Station with the train and light rail
tracks on the left, and the parking lot where the M&T Bank football
statium was built in the background. (source: https://populous.com/
posts/celebrating-quarter-century-camden-yards/)

art baseball stadium that could add to the synergy of the Inner
Harbor. When elected state governor for two consecutive terms
(1987 to 1995) he was successful in having the state legislature
approve the construction of such stadium with lottery money,
keeping it under the control of the state’s sports authority.
The city hired the local ÿrm RTKL for a speciÿc plan for a 40-acre
area three blocks west of the Inner Harbor to accommodate the
stadium (Figures 14 & 16). Known as Camden Yards, the land was
originally owned by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company
and, besides underutilized rail yards, it included two historic
buildings: a 1856 terminal station that still operated commuter
trains to Washington, and a 1,116-foot long eight-story brick
warehouse built by B&O in 1889 for the storage and distribution
of merchandise but became mostly vacant by the 1970s.
Considered East Coast's longest brick building, this unique historical examplar of railroad warehouse architecture inspired
HOK (now Populous) in their solution for Orioles Park, inaugurated in 1992. The 48,000-seat major league baseball stadium
was placed against the historic warehouse, renovated for Orioles facilities, box o˜ces, retail, restaurants, and a private club
in the upper ˝oors from where spectators enjoy privileged
views of the game (Figure 14). The warehouse inspired the new
architecture and served as the diamond's backdrop, creating
visual impact and a sense of enclosure.
Following the success of the Orioles Park and replacing an adjacent parking lot, a 71,000–seat multi-purpose football stadium
opened in 1998. The M&T Bank stadium, home to the Baltimore
Ravens as well as other sports and music events, is considered
by fans one of the best NFL stadiums. Besides the two stadiums,
Baltimore's Camden Yards Sports Complex include the Sports
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Legends Museum, installed in the renovated Camden Station,
and the nearby “Babe” Ruth Birthplace Museum.
The Camden Yards Sports Complex's accessibility is excellent.
Located within a short walking distance from both the downtown and the Inner Harbor, it is served by ramps to/from a major
state highway, by the commuter train services, and by the city’s
light rail system. Dedicated lots and nearby public parking structures accommodate around 30,000 vehicles, and circulation is
eased by having football and baseball games o°-hours and on
di°erent days of the week.
Light Rail to the Inner Harbor
During the ÿrst couple of decades after initiation of the Inner
Harbor Plan and like most large US cities, Baltimore did not have
an e˜cient public transportation system. A 1966 plan projected
six transit lines radiating from the downtown but, by 1983, only
one had been built, the Baltimore subway. During his ÿrst term
as the state governor, in the late eighties, former Baltimore
Mayor Donald Schaefer was able to push the construction
of a light rail system, under the administration of the state's
transit authority, facilitating access to the Inner Harbor and the
Camden Yards Sports Complex.
The 22-miles of the project's ÿrst phase where built relatively
fast, inexpensively, and without any federal funding using a single track system on existing streetcar and commuter rail rightsof-ways. Connecting the Maryland State Fair, Baltimore County,
in the north, to Anne Arundel County in the south, through
Camden Yards, the lightrail started operating in 1992, on time for
Oriole Park's inaugural game. In the late 1990s the system was
extended connecting the downtown and the Inner Harbor to
residential suburbs, business parks, a shopping mall, the University of Baltimore, Baltimore's Convention Center, Penn Station,
and the international airport. Many stations transfer to MTA bus
routes and o°er free parking. The two stations at the Camden
Yards Sports Complex (Orioles Park and M&T Bank Stadium), at
the Convention Center, and at Charles Center are particularly important for downtown workers, tourists, conference attendees
and game-goers, decreasing the need for parking (see Figures
14 & 16). The lightrail ride from the Baltimore-Washington Airport to downtown takes approximately thirty minutes.
Baltimore's light rail system was built on a single-track system
and used existing facilities to bring down costs, limiting its ˝exibility and leading to long headways (17 minutes), even at peak
hours. In the mid-2000s federal funds were secured to convert
the system to two parallel tracks, increasing its e˜ciency.
Notes on Implementation
The success of the Charles Center and the Inner Habor plans
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relied on several human actors and administrative factors that
helped sustain implementation, as commented along this twopart article: vision and willing to excel, integrated e°orts, the
involvement of the private sector, committed and dedicated
public o˜cials. The orchestrated e°orts between city, Greater
Baltimore Committee (GBC), and Charles Center-Inner Harbor
Development Corporation (CC-IHDC) were fundamental for
keeping plan implementation on track. As a powerful regional
organization of business and civic leaders and promoter of the
downtown renaissance since the mid-1950s, the GBC guaranteed the commitment of the private sector. Through agile,
private-sector-like administration, the CC-IHDC successfully attracted investors and made sure development in those areas
was prioritized and implemented according to the master plans.
An important factor to guarantee private development quality,
particularly in the initial years, was Baltimore's Design Advisory
Panel. Originally formed in 1964 from a federal requirement
to oversee redevelopment in downtown urban renewal areas,
such as the Charles Center and the Inner Harbor, the panel was
composed of six design experts appointed by the City. Later,
the group was renamed Urban Design and Architecture Review
Panel, and its responsibilities were extended to advise on
signiÿcant development projects in the city and those requiring
zoning changes or variances. Recommendations are issued
for schematic and ÿnal projects and, although without power
to veto projects, the panel's work was fundamental for the
implementation process and the design quality in both Charles
Center and the Inner Harbor, particularly in the ÿrst decades.
As is usual with the success of any plan, the Inner Harbor Plan
had many champions over the years. James Rouse (Rouse
Company's founder and very in˝uential in the city’s business
community), and Martin Millspaugh (chief executive o˜cer
of the CC-IHDC for twenty years) were certainly two of them.
But perhaps the most important player was William Schaefer,
Baltimore city-council member for sixteen years, four-time
mayor (1971-1987), two-term state governor (1987-1995),
and two-term state comptroller (1999-2007). Schaefer was a
driving force in transforming Baltimore into a model of urban
renaissance and tourism, particularly the Inner Harbor, the
center-piece of his administration. Personal and charismatic,
he used to drive around the city at night looking for problems
to solve, and knew how to inject Baltimoreans with a muchneeded sense of pride in their city. Schaefer was excellent
in getting things done and in attracting businesses. But he
was also criticized for his authoritarian style, for installing the
corporate model in city management, and for an economic
development model that did not help the most in need. Job
opportunities decreased, the quality of public schools declined,
poor neighborhoods got distressed, and crimes and drugs were
not subdued (Levine, 1987; Harvey 1991 & 2009).
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However, when Schaefer left city hall and the following administration moved its focus away from the Inner Harbor, the pace of
downtown revitalization declined and life did not get any better for the most needy. The lack of commitment together with
the 1990s economic crisis led Baltimore to miss investments,
residents, and merchants moving to the suburbs, and to experience a signiÿcant increase in crime rates. In 1991, all Baltimore's
quasi-public agencies were merged into a single non-proÿt entity, the Baltimore Development Corporation (BDC), generating
new problems for the Inner Harbor. Without CC-IHDC’s direct
agile administration and the city’s special attention, the Inner
Harbor became just another area dependent on the politics of
di°erent city departments, their budgets, and timing.
By the early 2000s successive city administrations worked towards stopping the downward spiral, focusing on attracting
economic development and on increasing Baltimore's quality
of life as a whole (Millspaugh, 2003; Harvey, 2003). However,
although the Inner Harbor Plan was updated in 2003 and private investments and new attractions were expanding, public
spaces by the waterfront were deteriorating. In 2005, business
owners, local institutions (such as the Maryland Science Center and the National Aquarium), and the City formed an alliance and funded the Waterfront Partnership, a non-proÿt with
the mission of maintaining the public spaces along the clean,
safe, and vibrant. However, the organization depended on city
grants and donations from the private sector, and its scope of
operations was very narrow.
In 2007, cognizant of the need for integrated management
of the water's edge, Baltimore's City Council created the Waterfront Management Authority that operates through public
grants and private donations, a small surcharge on commercial properties, and rents from the use of waterfront spaces.
This move led to beautiÿcation, expansions of the waterfront
promenade, and better maintenance, safety, signage and tourist facilities, including an award-winnin new visitor center at the
west waterfront promenade, just south of Harborplace.
While the 2003 Inner Harbor Master Plan Framework conÿrmed
the spirit of the 1965 plan, some of its recommendations and
the lack of a stronger, comprehensive attention to the original
vision by part of the city attracted much criticism, including
from David Wallace, author of both the Charles Center and the
Inner Habor original plan (Wallace, 2004). The stronger competition with other cities also meant that Baltimore adopted a
more aggressive approach to attract investment and developers, becoming more ˝exible in their demands. The city's new
development-oriented approach in the Inner Harbor was re˝ected in naming the new master plan a "framework". From the
mid-2000s, di°erent from the Inner Habor's heyday, projects
along the waterfront result from a much tougher negotiation

Figure 15: Redevelopment along the waterfront beyond the original
plan in Harbor East. (photo Judy Davis at Hoachlander Davis
Photography; courtesy of Ehrenkrantz Eckstut & Khun Architects)

between the city, the Baltimore Development Corporation, and
developers. Although the pedestrian promenade, bike lanes,
and small public spaces along the water's edge continue to
be implemented (Figure 15), the new architectural solutions,
set-backs, and easements along the waterfront re˝ect a more
“piece-meal” (Lang, 2005) urban design process and the plan's
original vision is in danger (see Figures 13 & 16).
The View from the Other Side
The positive impacts of the Inner Harbor redevelopment for the
city's life, image, and economy have been immense: from its
ÿrst phase as a recreation ground for Baltimoreans, to its second
phase as a tourist destination, and its current phase as a festival
place and an exclusive residential destination. “The Inner Harbor Master Plan of 1964 was substantially completed in twenty
instead of thirty years as originally projected, and with three
times the amount of development as thought possible” (Millspaugh, 2003: 40). By the early 2000s the numbers for the Inner
Harbor were impressive: 192 acres (76.8 hectares) of dilapidated
and abandoned waterfront property had been redeveloped,
real estate had appreciated by 600%, the city was collecting $60
million yearly from taxes, 15,000 direct and 50,000 indirect jobs
had been created, and 20 million visitors and 6.5 million tourists
were injecting $4 billion per year –a tourism industry previously
nonexistent (Millspaugh, 2001, 2003).
The real costs involved in redeveloping the Inner Harbor are
impossible to calculate given the numerous components,
variables, and actors over such a long period. In 1964, when the
plan was traced it projected $230 million in public and private
investments, $55 million of which was to acquire, demolish,
and prepare land for development (Wrenn, 1983). Peter Hall
(1988) noted that the project took $180 million of federal
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and $58 million of city funds while only $22 million from the
private sector. Brenn and Rigby (1996) estimated that the cost
of redeveloping the Inner Harbor's 94 acres totalled $2.5 billion.
According to Martin Millspaugh, CC-IHDC’s executive director
for twenty years, 75% of the total investment came from the
private sector and that project management cost taxpayers less
than 3% of the public funds invested (Millspaugh, 2001).
Baltimore’s urban renaissance strategy and the Inner Harbor,
particularly during the “Schae°er era”, has its critics. Levine
(1987) noted that while the industrial base was eroding, the
city’s corporate-center redevelopment model and the new
economy based on advanced services and tourism led to gentriÿcation, an uneven pattern of growth, and the worsening of
spatial dualities. For David Harvey (1991 & 2009), the corporate
model worsened Baltimore's widespread social erosion. He denounced the public-partnership model and the quasi-public
corporations as a “shadow” government, noting that, while private investors received heavy subsidies, the quality of social services and education were decreasing signiÿcantly, and most of
the city remained untouched by the glory of the Inner Harbor.

Planner David Wallace, mastermind of the original Inner Harbor
plan, also criticized the lack of investment in poorer neighborhoods, the lagging behind of the public schools, and the few
economic opportunities for the neediest (Wallace, 2004).
Martin Millspaugh, long-term president of the CC-IHDC, rebutted this type of criticism by noting that it would be a mistake to
believe that the Inner Harbor's revitalization could, on its own,
solve all the city’s problems (Millspaugh, 2003). Through the Inner Habor renaissance, hospitality, tourism, and the convention
industry became vital components of Baltimore’s economy. By
the end of the 2000s, the city had reverted much of the downward spiral (Millspaugh, 2003; Harvey, B., 2003). In 2017, Baltimore was ranked by Fortune magazine among the 20 best cities
to ÿnd a job. In this same year, according to Baltimore Development Corporation reports, the city was involved with almost one
hundred urban renewal, neighborhood, and speciÿc plans, and
93 development projects, of which only four were located in
the downtown -certainly an indicator that a signiÿcant amount
of e°ort was directed to the city as a whole. One of these is a
US$1.8 billion project for East Baltimore, one of the city's most

Figure 16: Recent view of Inner Harbor and surrounding development (photo by permission Shutterstock)
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distressed neighborhoods, that includes 2,200 new and rehabilitated homes, commercial spaces, a model school and childhood
center, a food enterprise center, a science and technology park,
and out-of-school, social, and health programs.
Lessons from Baltimore
Baltimore’s e°orts through the Charles Center and the Inner
Harbor plans discussed in the two parts of this article suggest
some lessons. In Charles Center, an o˜ce-oriented redevelopment, the plan and its implementation were similar to many
other examples in central cities, only of a more contained and,
certainly, less destructive approach (Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989).5
On the other hand, the Inner Harbor Plan, although preceded by
Boston's waterfron revitalization e°orts, became an international model and inspired several cases discussed in the literature
(Breen & Rigby 1993, 1996; Gordon, 1996; Marshall, 2001; Stevens, 2009). After Baltimore's Inner Harbor success, "waterfronts
became associated with ways to recreate the image of a city, to
recapture economic investment, and to attract people back to
deserted downtowns" (Marshall, 2001, p. 5).
As noted by Gordon (1996), to a large degree Baltimore's
success with both plans seems to depend on six fundamental
factors: construction of a city image, integration with context,
reuse of existing structures, public access, small actions, and
incremental planning. Although both plans in Baltimore shared
these factors, particularly the Inner Harbor, they also prove that
sustainable revitalization is a continuous process that depends
on planning processes that are ˝exible to some degree while
still pursuing the original vision and goals. The implementation
of such projects is far more complex and takes much longer
than normal development practices and various political and
economic cycles, meeting many unforeseeable problems.
Baltimore’s path to reinvent itself from a city of decay in the
1950's to one praised for the quality of the sustainable revitalization of its Inner Harbor was a long one. Looking back to the
late 1950's Charles Center Plan and the early 1960's Inner Harbor Plan, this essay discussed how advanced services, events,
tourism, leisure, and shopping represented the most important
stimulants of Baltimore’s economic recovery. Rehabilitating investor's trust in the downtown and the symbiosis between city
and water were fundamental in this process, and particularly
reconstructing the Inner Harbor's image as a special place for
recreation and, later, a place to live.
As with most successful plans, the fundamental factors in
Baltimore were the long-term planning process and political
commitment involved; the success of city leaders in attracting
5

See Part 1 of this essay in FOCUS 13, 2017.
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investment; the overall quality of the urban and architectural
design; and the synergetic mix of land uses and attractions.
From Baltimore’s experience, we can draw some lessons for a
sustainable revitalization:
• A sustainable plan includes political commitment, timing sensitivity, marketing, management and monitoring
processes that are strategic and sensitive to the market in
short, medium and long-term. Plan implementation must
be orchestrated by the city re˝ecting a consensual collaboration among stakeholders (governmental agencies of different levels, investors, developers, and community groups)
in a transparent, well monitored, and democratic process.
• A quasi-public corporation may be an agile and e°ective
way to manage the implementation process over a speciÿc
area but its actions must be transparent, fully integrated to
the plan's vision and city policies and, always responsive to
to the community interest over the long term.
• Plan and process needs to attend to rebuilding a place’s
image and appeal, as well as stakeholders and investors
conÿdence. Sustainability depends on the synergy between
a critical mass of land-uses and attractions, and on catalytic
developments (such as aquariums, stadiums, and shopping
malls), particularly at the early stages. Although catalysts
alone cannot guarantee the success of the revitalization
as a whole, they have proved to be essential to jumpstart a
process and its di°erent phases.
• Sustainable revitalization depends on a careful mix of
complementary lands uses in order to generate social, cultural, and economic dynamism. Retail and ground-˝oor
uses, as well as temporary activities and public events, must
feed and support active sidewalks and open spaces. The
design of large facilities need to assimilate this notion and
care for their impacts. Residential uses above ground level
are fundamental, and preferably serving a large spectrum of
socio-economic groups.
• Concentrating redevelopment priorities in a speciÿc area,
such as the watefront, and using the corporate or recreational-tourism models, should not come at the expense
of neighborhods and local communities. The plan and the
implementation process should take measures to avoid
displacement and the negative impacts of gentriÿcation,
and make a°ordable housing part of the mix.
• Accessibility is a cornerstone of a sustainable revitalization
process. The area needs to be well integrated and a living
part of the rest of the city and region. Transit, pedestrian,
and alternative mobility systems must be e˜ciently integrated. In Baltimore, e˜cient vehicular circulation integrated to the state highway system, several parking structures,
subway and light rail, pedestrian promenades, water-taxis,
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Figure 18: Basic timeline of development in the Inner Harbor
showing the major projects and facts discussed in this article.

Ecology
Economy

Figure 17: The sustainability pyramid (based on Godschalk, 2004).

and alternative forms of transport (skates and Segways, for
example) are reasonably well integrated and continuous.
• In Baltimore, attention was placed in the city imaging, aesthetics, and view corridors. In recognizing the waterfront as
the most important asset, its continuous visual experience
was guarateed through the pedestrian promenade by the
water's edge and by a relative respect for viewsheds from
surrounding development. The power of vision was also
recognized through urban design and architecture of quality that help create a sense of place and belonging, and respect, to a large degree, local memory.
The two parts of this essay helped to demonstrate how Baltimore’s revitalization process has been successful and sustainable over time, particularly in the Inner Habor area. Godschalk’s
sustainability model represented by a pyramid with livability
placed at the apex helps us consider Baltimore's successes from
an interesting perspective (Godschalk, 2004) (Figure 17).
Baltimore was very successful in the Charles Center and the Inner Habor areas, as discussed in this two-part essay, economically successful, ecologically correct, and very livable—at least
for certain groups of the population. Charles Center works well
mostly as an attractive downtown business district albeit with
little housing. The Inner Habor is a unique place with an attractive and dynamic mix of uses, most geared towards recreation
and leisure but with an increasingly stronger residential component. Despite the unavoidable consequences of economic
and political cycles, Baltimore needs to continue investing in
the quality of downtown revitalization, with a special focus on
the uniqueness and the synergy of its waterfront. However, in
the long run a sustainable revitalization will always be dependent on how these processes re˝ect on the rest of the city and
contribute to make Baltimore a livable city for all.

2007 Waterfront Management Authority formed
2005 Convention Center expands for 2nd time and adds hotel
2004 Modernization and expansion of Science Center
2001 Marriott at Inner Harbor East
1998 Successfull repurposing of Powerplant
Raven's stadium
Light rail connect to B-W International Airport
1995 American Visionary Art Museum
1993 Harborview residential complex
1992 Orioles at Camden Yard
Light rail
1991 Aquarium opens annex
Baltimore Development Corporation formed
1987 The Gallery mixed-use complex
1986 Expantion of Convention Center
Fells Point waterfront plan
1985 Powerplant repurposed for ÿrst time
1983 Inner Habor East Plan
Charles Center subway station
1981 National Aquarium
Hyatt Hotel
Pier Six Music Pavillion
1980 Harborplace festival marketplace pavillions
1979 Convention Center
1978 Otterbein Homesteading - historic district
1977 World Trade Center
1976 Maryland's Science Center
1976 Tall ships sail into the Inner Harbor for U.S. Bicentenial
1975 Transamerica Life building
Lutheran Church complex and apartments
1971 Inner Harbor West Plan
1970 First City Fair at the waterfront
1969 Baltimore Community College
1965 Charles Center-Inner Harbor Development Corp.
1964 Municiapal bonds for implementation of
Inner Harbor Plan announced
1962 First new o°ce building in Charles Center
1957 Charles Center Plan
1955 Clearing of part of Inner Harbor and new bulkheads
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Note
I am grateful to William Siembieda and Chris Clark (Cal Poly), Ivor
Samuels (Oxford), and particularly to Jay Brodie (retired president, Baltimore Development Corporation) for their comments
and suggestions. I would also like to thank Paul Dombrowski
(former director of planning and design, Baltimore Development Corporation) for maps and images of Baltimore.
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